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The impact of changes in the interest rate on long-term household borrowing is an important
parameter for assessing the eﬀectiveness of at least two important public policies. First,
the response of household borrowing to changes in interest rates helps us to understand the
determinants of investing in housing wealth and, ultimately, the eﬀectiveness of public policies
that aﬀect interest rates.1 Second, home mortgage interest rate subsidies are a common feature
of the tax codes of OECD countries -Poterba (2001).2 T h er e s p o n s eo fh o u s e h o l db o r r o w i n g
to ﬁnancial incentives is a likely channel through which mortgage interest rate deductions
alter the composition and lifetime proﬁle of individual’s savings.3 This paper estimates the
impact of the interest rate on household debt by exploiting a reform in a large program that
subsidized mortgage interest rate payments of two groups commonly considered to be on the
home ownership margin: young and lower income individuals.
Previous researchers have identiﬁed the eﬀect of interest rate incentives on long-term house-
hold debt by examining “quasi-experimental” variation induced by tax reforms. Maki (2001)
and Scholz (1994) study the eﬀects of changes in the tax treatment of borrowing on household
debt composition. They document that the US Tax Reform Act of 1986, that eliminated the
tax deduction on interest payments associated with consumer debt, increased the demand for
mortgage debt. Nevertheless, these studies do not estimate the overall interest elasticity of
consumer borrowing. Jappelli and Pistaferri (2002) provide evidence about the responsiveness
of household mortgage debt to tax incentives using a reform in the Italian tax system in 1993.
They ﬁnd that the change in tax incentives for taxpayers did not aﬀect the relative probability
of acquiring mortgage loans, and argue that lack of ﬁnancial information makes households
1Attanasio, Goldberg and Kyriazidou (2000) show in a durable goods context that liquidity constraints
dampen the response of household borrowing to changes in interest rates.
2Poterba (2001) reviews the tax incentives to mortgage borrowing in several OECD countries. While the
United States, Netherlands, France and Italy provide tax incentives to mortgage debt, only the tax code in
Netherland provides tax incentives to consumer debt. Glaeser and Shapiro (2002) claim that, in the US, after
state taxes, home mortgage interest deduction is the the most common deduction.
3Poterba (1984) derives the user-cost of housing as a function of the mortgage interest rate deduction.
Gervais (2002) shows that the interaction between non taxing imputed rents and mortgage interest rate
subsidies introduces a wedge between the after-tax return on saving in housing and the return on saving in
other ﬁnancial assets. He uses a dynamic general equilibrium model to illustrate that removing mortgage
interest rate deductions decreases the home-ownership rate and household debt, and increases consumption
early in life.
1unaware of the tax advantages associated with acquiring mortgage debt.4
This paper identiﬁes the eﬀect of mortgage interest rate subsidies on total long-term house-
hold borrowing by exploiting a reform of a large program in Portugal called Credito Boniﬁcado
(CB program). The CB program was launched in 1986 as a system of subsidies to individuals
with lower incomes who wanted to purchase a house ﬁnanced by a mortgage loan. In the last
quarter of 1998 a national-level ceiling was established on the value of the house that could be
bought through the program, so that eligible households willing to buy a house whose price
exceeded the ceiling did not qualify for any subsidy at all. Simple calculations show that the
present value of the stream of mortgage payments due by an eligible individual could increase
up to 26% with respect to the pre-reform period. Our identiﬁcation strategy relies on the
following idea. A uniform ceiling is most likely to bind in regions in which the average price
of real estate was highest before the reform. Hence, we compare the trend in the borrowing
behavior among individuals eligible for the subsidy who lived in regions with high real estate
prices to the borrowing behavior of ineligible individuals and of eligible individuals living in
regions where the price of real estate was low pre-reform.
T h e r ea r ef o u rm a i nr e a s o n st h a tm a k et h ea n a l ysis in the present work an interesting setup
to analyze the impact of the interest rate on household borrowing. The ﬁrst reason is that,
unlike the CB program, most tax codes have one of the following two characteristics that hinder
their eﬀectiveness. Home mortgage interest rate subsidies reimburse the subsidy only after
the payment has been made, and they usually provide higher implicit subsidies to individuals
with high taxable income.5 Hence, tax incentives beneﬁt individuals who are likely to access
debt markets even in the absence of the subsidy (see Glaeser and Shapiro, 2002). In contrast
to these features, the CB program targeted young individuals and individuals in the lower
4This paper focuses on the response of the probability of acquiring long-term household debt to changes in
the interest rate (the extensive margin). Gary-Bobo and Larribeau (2003) estimate the response of household
mortgage debt amount to the interest rate among household who choose to acquire debt (the intensive margin).
There is a related literature on the response of consumer debt to changes in the interest rate (Gross and
Souleles, 2002, and Alessie, Hochguertel and Weber, 2001). There is also a substantial literature on the
eﬀects of tax incentives on household saving. Engelhardt (1996) exploits the cancellation of a program in
Canada that provided tax subsidies to savings towards the purchase of a house, and ﬁnds that changes in tax
incentives increase national saving. The US evidence on the eﬀects of tax incentives on household saving is
more controversial. See Bernheim (2002) for a survey.
5The Mortgage Interest Relief at Source (MIRS) is an exception to the rule of reimbursement after the
payment is made. See Devereux and Lanot (2003) for a detailed description of the MIRS program in the UK.
2part of the income distribution, and it provided subsidies at the source, that is, the individual
did not have to pay the installment before getting the subsidy. The second reason is that the
CB program provided four diﬀerent subsidies to eligible individuals, a feature that allows us
to examine the responses of several treatment groups to the change in incentives. Third, while
tax incentives may not be eﬀective because individuals lack the relevant information about
ﬁnancial markets, or about the tax code (see Jappelli and Pistaferri, 2002, 2003), the CB
program was well-known in Portugal. In 1998, two out of three new mortgages signed were
subsidized by the CB program. Fourth, we use a unique sample obtained by merging household
survey data to administrative records on individual debt. Most of the work on the impact of
tax incentives on individual debt is based on household surveys, which usually measure wealth
and debt at the aggregate household level. Our sample enables us to study the borrowing
behavior of diﬀerent individuals within the household: an important advantage when studying
borrowing patterns in a country with thin rental markets and extended co-residence between
young adults and their parents.
Our estimates suggest that the loss of access to the subsidy coincided with a fall in the
probability of signing a new loan by between 4 and 10 percentage points, depending on the
eligible group considered. These estimates imply a large elasticity of the probability of bor-
rowing to changes in the mortgage interest rate subsidies of -2.9. The estimates are robust to
alternative functional form speciﬁcations, and contrast to recent ﬁndings on the eﬀect of tax
incentives household on mortgage borrowing behavior. We also document that the response
of borrowing to the changes in the interest rate is especially high among young adults who co-
reside with their parents. An interpretation of this result is that young adults react to adverse
housing market conditions by staying with their parents, a pattern of behavior documented
in other Southern European countries (see e.g. Martínez-Granado and Ruiz-Castillo, 2002 or
Manacorda and Moretti, 2001).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the characteristics of the CB
program, and the details of the 1998 reform. Section 3 uses a simple analytical framework,
adapted from Henderson and Ioannides (1983) to claim that the reform under consideration
can be used to estimate the response of the probability of getting a new loan to changes in the
interest rate. Section 4 describes the data and discusses our empirical methodology. Section 5
3provides the baseline empirical results, and assesses potential explanations for the discrepancy
with previous ﬁndings in the literature. In Section 6, we test our empirical methodology, by
examining whether pre—existing trends could explain our results, and by discussing the extent
to which the CB scheme was passed on to real estate prices. Section 7 concludes.
2T h e Credito Boniﬁcado Program
In 1986, the Portuguese Government enacted the Credito Boniﬁcado (CB program), a program
intended to stimulate the access to home ownership among young and low-income individuals.
The CB program provided various types of interest rate reductions at source to eligible house-
holds who ﬁnanced with a mortgage loan either (a) the purchase of the house of residence or
(b) the construction or repairs of the house of residence or (c) the purchase of land towards
the construction of the house of residence. Only households with taxable income below a
given threshold, and who were not currently holding any type of mortgage debt were eligible
for the program. The amount of the loan could not exceed the total value of the house, and
a person purchasing a house ﬁnanced with a subsidized loan was not allowed to sell it within
ap e r i o do fﬁve years.6
The CB program subsidized a proportion of the monthly interest rate payments of a
mortgage loan. The subsidy was given by the Portuguese Ministry of Finance directly to
the lending institution, so that any household receiving the subsidy had its monthly payment
eﬀectively reduced from the ﬁrst installment on. The subsidized proportion was constant for
the ﬁrst two years of the loan, fell at a 1% rate during the subsequent three years of the life of
the mortgage loan, and at a 2% rate thereafter, until exhaustion.7 The proportion subsidized
6If the house was sold before the time limit, the individual would be obliged to return the amount subsidized
plus a premium. Under some circumstances, such as moving to another region for work-related circumstances,
the government could waive the obligation to return the subsidy. Decree-law n. 328-B/86, September 30th,
1986.
7In addition to the standard CB program, the government provided an extended subsidy to young individ-
uals, called Credito Boniﬁcado Jovem (CB-young, hereinafter). This extended subsidy targeted singles less
than thirty years old or couples with the sum of ages less than ﬁfty-ﬁve. For the CB-young program, the
subsidy was constant for the ﬁrst four years, decreased at a 1% rate during the following two years and after
that at a 2% rate until exhaustion. We ignore this diﬀerential subsidy throughout the analysis, as simulations
using the example in Table 1 (not shown) suggest that the diﬀerential subsidy for the young was 2% of the
corresponding subsidy for the regular program. We also ignore the mortgage interest rate subsidy in the
Portuguese tax code, which is relatively small.
4depended negatively on the taxable income of the family, following an adjustment for family
size.8
The program oﬀered a 44% subsidy on interest rate payments during the ﬁrst two years of
the loan to households whose (adjusted) taxable income was below 3.25 times the minimum
annual income (class 1.) The corresponding starting subsidy was 32.5% for households with
taxable income between 3.25 and 3.50 times the minimum annual income (class 2.) Households
with taxable income between 3.5 and 4.25 times the minimum annual income (class 3) had an
initial subsidy of 21% of interest rate payments, and those with taxable income between 4.25
and 4.75 the minimum annual income (class 4), the initial subsidy was 10% of the interest rate
payment. According to our sample (see Section 4), 67% of Portuguese taxable units, between
18 and 55 years of age, qualiﬁed for the maximum subsidy, 7% for the class 2 subsidy, 5% for
the class 3 subsidy and 3% for the class 4 subsidy.
Table 2 illustrates an example of the savings associated with the CB program. We assume
an initial mortgage loan of 48,000 euro with twenty-ﬁve-year maturity, a constant interest
rate of 8%. The ﬁrst column shows the evolution of the amount of outstanding debt. The
second column shows the (constant) stream of payments. The fourth column presents the
stream of payment in period-zero euros which, by construction, must add up to the initial
loan amount of 48,000 euro. The ﬁfth column presents the annual percentage of subsidy for
a family in class 1 subsidy and the sixth column the actual yearly payment. Discounting the
stream of payments to the moment in which the mortgage was granted and summing up the
amounts yields 36,408 which represents 76% of the amount paid by a family with an identical
mortgage, but without the subsidy. Similar analyses for the other classes of subsidy show that
individuals in classes 2, 3 and 4 would pay respectively, 84%, 92% and 97% of the baseline
48,000 euro. Aggregate evidence suggests that the subsidy was eﬀective, in the sense that it
was not passed-through into higher interest rates.9
8The adjustment consisted in deducting an amount from the taxable income of the family. The deduction
depended on family size. Details on the data appendix.
We use “household” as the eligible unit for the program. As explained in Section 4, the taxpaying unit in
Portugal is the family. Couples are required to ﬁle taxes jointly, and individuals above 18 years of age living
with his or her parents, have the option of either ﬁling taxes with his or her parents, at the head’s marginal
tax rate or ﬁling individually, if personal income exceeds a threshold.
9Aggregate records of average interest rates by loan type, provided by the Portuguese Ministry of Finance,
show that in February 2001, the average interest rate charged to a person with a CB loan was 7.59 per cent,
5The subsidy provided by the CB program could potentially have a signiﬁcant impact on
household net income. Using the 2000 wave of the Inquerito ao Patrimonio e Endividamento
das Familias (IPEF), we have estimated that monthly mortgage payments represented, on
average, 21% of total net household income.10 This means that the subsidy on mortgage loans
could represent up to 9.3% of monthly net income at the period of maximum subsidy for class
1 households.
In the last quarter of 1998, the Portuguese Government reformed the program. To be
eligible for the subsidy, households satisfying the income requirements could not purchase
a house above a ceiling. The particular limit depended on the taxable income and on the
family size of eligible households, but not on the place of residence.11 For example, a two-
person household with income below 3.25 times the minimum annual income could only be
subsidized for the purchase of a house whose price was below 63,500 euro (in euros of 1998.) If
the value of the purchased house exceeded the value of the ceiling by one euro, the household
was no longer eligible for any type of subsidy (aside from the standard income tax deduction,
which is very small in Portugal.) The reform was eﬀective in the second quarter of 1999, and
hereinafter, we refer to it as the 1999 reform.
We have used the IPEF 2000 to compute the average values of the houses for the various
eligible classes and compare them to the 1999 ceilings. According to our own calculations
from the IPEF 2000, the average (median) value of a house bought before 1999 by households
eligible for the maximum subsidy was 71,028 euro (62,350 euro). We have estimated that the
limits introduced by the reform were in the 60th percentile of the distribution of the value of
houses bought by eligibles before the 1999 reform.
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the number and the value of mortgages created during
while the average interest rate charged to a non-CB loan was 7.43. From February 2001 until May 2002, the
diﬀerence in the charged interest rates never exceeded 16 basis points. See Devereux and Lanot (2003) for
evidence on the incidence of MIRS on mortgage ﬁnancial costs.
10The IPEF is a survey on wealth holdings of Portuguese households, conducted for the ﬁrst time in the
year 2000.
11The limit was established according to the decree-law n. 349/98, November 11th, 1998. For eligibles of
class 1, the limit was 62,350 euro, 68,585 euro, 81,055 euro or 87,290 euro if the family size was 1,2,3 or 4, and
above, respectively. Conditional on family size, households eligible for the class 2 subsidy had higher limits:
69,832 euro (1 individual), 76,815 euro (2 individuals), 90,781 euro (three or four individuals) and 97,764 euro
(ﬁve or more). The corresponding limits for class 3, were: 77,314 euro, 85,045 euro, 100,508 euro and 108,239
euro, and ﬁnally, for class 4 the limits were: 84,796 euro, 93,275 euro, 110,234 euro and 118,714 euro.
6the period spanning 1990 and 2001.12 Probably due to the steady decrease in the interest
rates over the decade and to the increase in competition in the commercial banking sector,
mortgage loans signiﬁcantly increased after 1994.13 Between 1994 and 1998, the aggregate
value of mortgage loans increased from 3 billion euro until 12 billion euro. In 1994, one out
of two new euros of mortgage debt were borrowed under CB loans. In 1998, the proportion
rose to two out of three euros borrowed through CB loans. After 1999 the total amount of
mortgage debt and the relative proportion of euros created through the CB loans decreased
dramatically. In 2000 only 43 cents out of each euro of new mortgages were borrowed through
the program.14
The evolution of total number of mortgages is similar to the evolution of the total value of
loans. In 1994, 84,445 mortgages were issued, with an average value of 35,702 euro. Among
these, CB loans accounted to 43,875 contracts with average value of 34,141 euro per loan.
By 1998, the total number of new mortgages was 216,631 (average value of 48,351 euro per
mortgage). In that year the CB program contributed with 130,335 loans, with an average
value of 51,239 euro per loan. By the end of 2001, the number of total new loans decreased to
153,134 (average loan of 64,425 euro) where the CB loans were 67,351 with an average value
of 63,115 euro per loan. The pattern described above suggests that the 1999 reform had a
substantial eﬀect on the borrowing behavior of households. We use this reform to estimate
the eﬀect of a change in the interest rate on household long-term debt, using micro data from
the period spanning 1998 and 2001.
3 Framework for the analysis
This section uses a simple model of consumption of housing services (see Henderson and
Ioannides, 1983) to discuss how the 1999 reform in the CB program can be used to identify
12Source: Portuguese Ministry of Finance (http://www.dgt.pt/informacoes/default.htm).
13Between the end of 1994 and the end of 2001, the country aggregate interest rate implicit on outstanding
household loans with maturity of 5-years or longer decreased from an average of 13% to 5%. During this period,
the 6-month interest rate benchmark (Lisbor) decreased from 11.3% to 2.64% by May 1999. It increased to
3.57% by the end of 2001.
14According to our calculations from IPEF 2000, the take-up rate of the CB program among eligible house-
holds was 51%. However, this number could be biased, as eligibility class is measured in year 2000, when the
household is interviewed, but not at the moment of signing the loan. This take-up rate would be comparable
to the take-up rate of 401(k) in the US during the mid-eighties (see Engen and Gale, 2000.)
7the eﬀect of an exogenous change in the interest rate on consumers’ borrowing behavior. We
claim that the reform allows us to get a lower bound on the eﬀect of the interest rate on
borrowing behavior.
Let a consumer who lives for two periods and cares about non-durable consumption today
(c1), tomorrow (c2), and about the amount of housing services (h), with utility function
U(c1,c 2,h). We also assume perfect certainty, and that the consumer receives income y1 in
the ﬁrst period, and y2 in the second. In the ﬁrst period, the consumer chooses whether or
not to acquire housing services h at a cost of p euro per unit. The consumer has an outside
option yielding a utility level ¯ U that involves consuming an amount of services h. Investment
in housing neither depreciates nor increases its value. The consumer can access the credit
market, at an interest rate r, but only to acquire housing services, and with the constraint
that the amount borrowed per unit of housing services m cannot exceed the total price of
housing services, p. The intertemporal budget constraint of the consumer is the following (see











We concentrate on the case in which income in the second period y2 is suﬃciently high
relative to the ﬁrst period y1, so that the consumer must ﬁnance at least a part of the purchase
of services through a mortgage. In that setting, acquiring new housing services requires
borrowing in the debt market.15
Let the equation (BC) represent the budget constraint for an eligible individual in the
pre-1999 reform situation. This individual faces an eﬀective after-subsidy interest rate of
r(1−.24),w h e r er is the market interest rate, and we make use of the computations in Table
1. The budget constraint is represented in Figure 2. The full (dotted) line represents the pre-
(post-) 1999 reform budget constraint (ignoring wealth eﬀects caused by the change in the
interest rate.) Before the 1999 reform, the consumer could trade-oﬀ any amount of housing
services h and life-cycle non-durable consumption at a relative price of p
r(1−.24)
1+r(1−.24), or p .76r
1+.76r.
15Also, we only examine the net borrowing of the consumer, and hence ignore the decision to save. An alter-
native justiﬁcation to ignore the saving decisions is that consumers faced a higher interest rate for borrowing
rb than for lending rl. It is easy to prove that, in this situation, the consumer either borrows or saves, but not
both -see Attanasio et al. (2000).
8The 1999 reform introduced a severe discontinuity, as eligible individuals did not qualify for
any subsidy at all if the value of housing services purchased exceeded the ceiling L by one
euro. At the value of the ceiling, the relative price of housing services became r
1+r.
Our parameter of interest is the response of consumers’ borrowing behavior to a change
in the interest rate from the ﬁrst euro borrowed, holding p constant. Hence, we discuss three
possible responses to the 1999 reform, according to the preferences of individuals, and how
these responses relate to the parameter of interest.
Case 1 Individuals with low preference for housing services are not aﬀected by the reform.
That is the case of individuals who, at the pre-reform cost of housing services, demand
an amount of h such that ph is below the ceiling L. Nevertheless, if these individuals had
experienced an increase in the housing cost from the ﬁrst unit of housing services, they would
have diminished their propensity to borrow. Hence, the introduction of a ceiling does not
aﬀect the borrowing behavior of these individuals.
Case 2 For individuals with intermediate preferences for housing services, the change in the
probability to borrow after the introduction of a ceiling underestimates the uncompensated
derivative of the probability to borrow with respect to a change in interest rate from the ﬁrst
euro borrowed.
The preferences of these individuals are such that their demand for housing services at
the pre-reform cost of housing exceeds the ceiling, and their outside option, (which does not
involve the acquisition of a mortgage loan) yields lower utility than consuming at the ceiling.
Hence, these consumers respond to the reform by purchasing housing services at the value
of the ceiling, while if the cost of borrowing had increased from the ﬁrst euro, they would
have chosen the outside option. The situation is illustrated in ﬁgure 2. The indiﬀerence curve
representing the utility of not participating in the housing market (¯ U) cuts the pre-reform
budget constraint of the consumer to the left of the ceiling. At the pre-reform cost, the
consumer is better oﬀ consuming housing services than with the outside option. Nevertheless,
if the 1999 reform had not introduced a ceiling, the consumer would have left the housing
9market, as her ¯ U lies to the northeast of an alternative budget constraint with slope r
1+r from
the ﬁrst unit of housing services.
Also, note that among consumers who purchase housing services both at the pre- and post-
1999 interest rates, the introduction of a ceiling may make it optimal to reduce the amount of
housing services to the ceiling, so that the new demand for housing services is much lower than
the optimal choice at the post- 1999 reform interest rate in the absence of a ceiling. Then, for
a given price of housing services, the introduction of a ceiling can cause the observed change
in the amount borrowed before and after the 1999 reform to be either an underestimate or
an overestimate of the uncompensated derivative of the amount borrowed to a change in the
interest rate.
Case 3 For individuals with high levels of preference for housing services, the change in the
probability to borrow after the introduction of a ceiling does provide an estimate of the uncom-
pensated derivative of the probability to borrow to a change in interest rate.
Consumers in this group are characterized by their desired amount of housing services
being above the ceiling both at the pre- and post- reform cost of housing. Also, they derive
higher utility consuming housing services above L
p at the post- reform interest rate than at
the ceiling. These consumers choose to get additional housing services depending on whether
or not the utility of the outside option is higher or lower than the utility acquiring services
at the post-reform cost of housing. The change in the propensity to borrow for this set of
c o n s u m e r sa f t e rt h er e f o r mi st h es a m ea si ft h ep o s t - r e f o r mc o s to fh o u s i n gw a s r
1+r from the
ﬁrst euro.
Summarizing all cases, we obtain the following claim, proven in Appendix B.
Claim 1 Holding p constant, the change in pre- and post- reform participation in the mortgage
market after the introduction of a ceiling provides an underestimate of the response of the
propensity to borrow to the change in the cost of a mortgage from the ﬁrst euro borrowed.
This is not necessarily the case for the evolution of the amount of debt.
Claim 1 assumes that p, the unit price of housing services is constant. Yet, there is
substantial regional variation in the price per unit of housing, which has consequences for
10the eﬀectiveness of the reform. Assume that the elasticity of the expenditure in housing
services with respect to the price p is positive (equivalently, that the elasticity of housing
services with respect to the price is negative but smaller than one in absolute value.) Holding
the distribution of preferences constant across regions, individuals living in regions with high
prices are more likely to spend higher amounts in housing services than similar individuals
living in low-price regions.16 The ceiling L was set at the national level and, consequently,
case 1 is more likely to occur in areas with low average prices than in areas with high average
prices. The change in borrowing behavior after the reform is likely to be stronger in regions
with higher pre-reform real state prices. That heterogeneity in responses to the reform provides
the basis for our empirical test.
In Section 4.2, we group consumers who live in areas that were “expensive” or “inexpen-
sive” prior to the 1999 reform, and estimate the eﬀect of the change in the interest rate on the
probability of borrowing from the diﬀerential response of the propensity to borrow between
eligibles in “high-price” areas and eligibles in “low-price” areas. Our identifying assumption
is that the reform in the CB program did not aﬀect the propensity to borrow among eligibles
living in low-price areas. That assumption is supported by the evidence in Section 5, docu-
menting that within “low-price” areas, eligible individuals did not signiﬁcantly decrease the
probability of signing new loans with respect to non-eligibles.17
Given that the evolution of the amount of debt after the reform can be a biased estimate
of the derivative of the debt amount to the change in the interest rate, and that the sign of the
bias cannot be determined a priori, we focus the discussion on the analysis of the extensive
margin: i.e., on the probability of signing a new loan. Finally, we focus the discussion in the
demand side of the housing market and, in Section 6.2, we discuss to what extent the 1999
reform aﬀected the evolution of housing prices.
16In Appendix B, in claim 2, we discuss the conditions under which the elasticity of the expenditure in
housing services increases with the price p.
17In the empirical analysis we identify “high -price” areas as counties in which the average price of a
purchased house in 1998 exceeded the national average.
The evidence in Table 4 supports the hypothesis that the eﬀects of the 1999 reform on the propensity to
borrow were not negative in low-price areas.
114T h e D a t a
Our sample combines a representative Portuguese household survey including employment
status, demographics and income and administrative records of outstanding debt levels. The
main source of data is drawn from a quarterly rotating panel called Inquérito ao Emprego
(IE), from 1998 to 2001. The IE follows respondents for at most six consecutive quarters, and
includes information on the educational level of the individual, labor force status, occupation,
industry and demographics, much like the US CPS. Unfortunately, it does not contain any
asset information.
T h ed e b td a t aa r et a k e nf r o mt h eCentral de Risco de Crédito database (CRC) collected by
the Banco de Portugal (Portuguese Central Bank). This dataset is unique in the sense that it
is a panel of all Portuguese individuals who hold any debt from ﬁnancial institutions between
1995 and 2001. Each Portuguese ﬁnancial institution authorized to lend credit to consumers,
is required by law to report to the central authority the amount of individual debt and, in the
case of short-term debt, credit limits.18 The information on the CRC sample includes separate
records for the stock of debt held by a given individual with maturity of less than a year and
for the stock of debt with maturity exceeding one year. Hence, for each individual, we do not
know whether or not a speciﬁc loan is a mortgage or a consumer loan. The IE and the CRC
records were matched by the staﬀ at the Banco de Portugal using variables common across
the two databases, namely the exact date of birth, the gender of the individual, and the place
of residence (county) the individual lived in, one year before the interview.
Given that claimants for the CB program had to present their last tax return to be eligible
for the program, the unit of observation in our analysis is the combination “taxpaying unit”-
year. The taxpaying unit coincides with the household in the case of married individuals, as in
Portugal married couples must ﬁle jointly. Hence, each married couple or each single individual
living in their own household and earning income above the minimum yearly wage contributes
one observation per year. The case of individuals above the age of 18, who earn income and
18The Bank of Portugal centralizes all outstanding individual debt. The CRC database is conﬁdential, but
c a nb eu s e db yﬁnancial institutions upon certain circumstances. If an individual asks a bank for a loan, the
commercial bank is allowed to obtain a report from the Central Bank with the current total outstanding debt
of this individual.
12co-reside with their parents, is slightly more complicated. According to the Portuguese law,
these individuals may opt for ﬁling jointly with their parents or for ﬁling taxes separately.
There are clear incentives in most cases to ﬁle separately from parents, both to pay less tax
and to qualify for the CB program. Also, the group of co-residing young adults is likely to
beneﬁt the most from the CB program, as the transition to home ownership in Portugal does
not occur through the rental market, but young adults reside with their parents well into
their twenties and then purchase the home of residence.19 Based on these considerations, we
consider as a separate tax-paying unit each dependent individual above 18 residing with his
or her parents and earning income.
A l s o ,w ec o n s t r u c to u rs a m p l ei nt h ef o l l o w i n gw a y .T h et i m eu n i to ft h eI Ei st h eq u a r t e r ,
so the combined sample consists of 13 quarterly surveys. Nevertheless, we are interested in
the probability of signing a loan in a given year.20 Hence, we pooled together observations
from all the quarterly surveys and kept one observation per individual per year.
We restrict the initial sample to “taxpaying units” in which the main earner is between
18 and 55 years of age, is not self-employed and whose reported income exceeds the minimum
yearly wage. As CB claimants could not have any outstanding mortgage, we also drop indi-
viduals who already had debt at the beginning of the survey year. To determine eligibility, we
add the earnings of both spouses in the case of married individuals.21 When computing family
size, we exclude individuals in the household who are 18 years or more and report positive
income. Each individual contributes at most one observation per year, and we use informa-
tion from three years: 1998, 2000 and 2001 (1999 is excluded, given that it was a transitional
19Data from the 1998 I n q u e r i t oa oE m p r e g o(ﬁrst quarter) indicate that 75% of young adults between 18
and 30 years of age reside with their parents.
20In earlier drafts of the paper, we estimated the probability of signing a loan in a given quarter, keeping all
the observations from all quarters in the IE. The results were very imprecise, probably because the probability
of signing a new loan in a given quarter is a very low-probability event (it was around 1 per cent among
eligibles for the maximum subsidy.)
21The details of the eligibility measure are described in Appendix A. Eligibility for the CB subsidy depends
on family income and family size. The Inquerito ao Emprego contains information on monthly net labor income
for salaried workers, business income for self-employed, unemployment beneﬁts for unemployed, and pension
income for retirees. We use only salaried workers, unemployed or retired individuals, and impute pre-tax
labor income from the standard withholding rules in the Portuguese law. We do not have direct information
on transfer income or asset income. Hence, the eligibility measure could be subject to measurement error.
We have computed the proportion of household income that comes from labor earnings using the 2000 IPEF
survey, and this amounts to 93.4% of total earnings. The proportion of eligibles in both samples is similar.
13year.) Note that the rotation scheme may make individuals contribute two observations to
the sample.
The dependent variable takes a value of zero if the individual held zero debt during the
four quarters of the survey year, and 1 if the amount of outstanding debt changed from zero
to more than 5,000 euro during any of the four quarters of the survey year.22
As discussed in Section 3, an important variable in our analysis is whether an individual
lives in a “high-price” county prior to the passage of the 1998 reform. The Portuguese National
Statistics Agency only started collecting average prices of houses sold in 2001. These prices
may be the consequence of the passing of the reform. To get the distribution of pre-reform
prices by county, we deﬂated prices of houses using an index for prices collected by the Banco
de Portugal during the period 1998-2001.23 We further restrict the sample to counties in which
real estate prices in 1998 are available.24
Overall, we have 16,587 observations from 13,819 individuals.25 Table 2 presents the
summary statistics of our sample. 83% of the individuals in our sample are eligible for the
program and 68% qualify for the maximum subsidy. Table 2 suggests that the probability of
having a new loan increases with the income classes, from 6% among the households that are
eligible for class 1 to 12% for the individuals that are not eligible. The amount of new loans
is on average 29,977 euro.
4.1 The empirical methodology
We begin by estimating variants of the following model.
1(Dit > 0) = α0 + α1EL_1i ∗ AFTERt + α2EL_2i ∗ AFTERt




0Xit + θi + ηit (1)
22Casual discussions with various mortage branch managers in Lisbon, from diﬀerent ﬁnancial groups,
suggest that EUR 5,000 is a lower bound for a mortgage. In Table 5, we experiment with a limit of 7,500 euro.
23The real estate indices are based on monthly data from real estate agencies, i.e., prices of the supply of
housing services. These data are gathered by the company Conﬁdencial Imobiliário.
24There are 278 counties in Portugal, and their average area is 306 km2. For our analysis, we use observations
on 117 counties, for which the evolution of housing prices is available.
2511,051 individuals contribute one observation, and 2,768 individuals contribute two observations. The
number of observations in 1998, 2000 and 2001 is 7,247, 5,903, and 3,437, respectively.
14First, we discuss the case in which the dependent variable takes value one if the household
acquired during the present year (any type of) debt with maturity longer than one year, and
zero otherwise. EL_1i, EL_2i,a n dEL_3i are binary variables indicating whether or not
the individual is eligible for the program, and what eligibility class the individual belongs
to.26 The omitted group includes individuals who are not eligible for the program. AFTERt
is a binary variable that takes value 1 if the new loan is signed in the post-reform periods of
2000 and 2001 and 0 if it is signed in the 1998 period. Xit contains demographics aﬀecting
the individual’s propensity to borrow, such as a polynomial in age, family status variables
and whether the individual co-resides with parents (listed in Table 4.) Finally, we allow for
an individual-speciﬁc error term, θi, that we assume to be uncorrelated with the explanatory
variables.
The parameters of interest are α1,α2,a n dα3, the coeﬃcients of the interaction between
AFTER and ELi. The interpretation of α1 is the diﬀerence between the change in the
propensity to sign a new loan during the 1998 and 2001 periods for eligibles for class 1 subsidy
and the corresponding change for non-eligibles. Given the discussion in the Section 3, we
expect α1,α2,a n dα3 to be negative.
Model (1) uses the time variation between 1998 and 2001 for the three eligible groups to
identify the eﬀects of changes in the interest rate on the probability of signing a new loan
over time. As discussed in Section 3, Model (1) restricts the responses to the 1999 reform
to be uniform within eligibles, that is not a suitable speciﬁcation. As a consequence, we also
estimate the following speciﬁcation:
26We decided to pool together eligibility groups III and IV. The reason is that there is a relatively small
number of individuals who signed loans in these classes.
151(Dit > 0) = β0 + δ1EL_1i ∗ H_Pi ∗ AFTERt + δ2EL_2i ∗ H_Pi ∗ AFTERt














β11+iEL_Ji ∗ H_Pi + β
0Xit + θi + ηit (2)
H_Pi denotes that the county of residence of the individual is “high-price.” We deﬁne
counties with high prices as those in which the average price of traded dwellings in 1998 was
above the country mean, 83,282 euro. To avoid biases caused by individuals moving to a low
price region in response to the reform, we use the county of residence one year prior to the
interview (that is, one year before getting the loan.)27 The speciﬁcation in model (2) uses
three sources of variation to identify the eﬀects of changes in interest rate on the probability
of signing a new loan. First, it exploits the time variation from the reform of the program.
Second, model (1) uses the variation in interest rate subsidies across eligible groups and,
ﬁnally, it permits diﬀerential eﬀects for high-price counties. The coeﬃcients of interest are δ1,
δ2 and δ3. For example, δ1 measures the diﬀerence in the change in the propensity to borrow
during 1998 and 2001 between eligibles for the maximum subsidy living in high-price counties
and ineligibles in the same counties, net of the same trend among individuals living in low
price counties.
There is an issue regarding the exogeneity of some of the covariates: the same set of
unobserved characteristics may lead individuals to get a mortgage and establish their own
household, for example. To assess the robustness of our results to possible endogeneity of the
covariates, we estimate three alternative speciﬁcations for each model: one without covariates,
27There could still be a problem with individuals responding in the 2001 wave, if they moved in 1999 or
2000, for example. For those individuals, the county of residence one year before getting the loan in 2001
may itself be a response to the reform. We think that the restrictions in our sample mitigate that potential
problem. Individuals who have moved recently are likely to have a mortgage to purchase a new house. We
restrict the individuals in our sample to have zero debt holdings prior to getting a loan, who are less likely to
have moved in the year before the interview.
16another with a small set of what we consider “safe” covariates (education dummies, variables
related to eligibility, such as family size, and a third-order polynomial in age) and a ﬁnal
speciﬁcation with a full set of covariates, including county ﬁxed-eﬀects.
4.1.1 The debt amount









0Xit + ε1it (3)
lndit = β0 + β1EL_1i ∗ AFTERt + β2EL_2i ∗ AFTERt + β3EL_3i ∗ AFTERt
+δ5EL_1i + δ6EL_2i + δ7EL_3i + δ




it is a latent variable indicating the individual’s i desire to borrow at moment
t. lndit is the logarithm of the amount of new long-term debt signed by the individual,
w h i c hi so b s e r v e do n l yi fI∗
it is positive. Xit denotes the same set of demographic variables
as in the previous speciﬁcation. ε1it and ε2it are distributed normally with correlation ρ.
Separate identiﬁcation of the equations is achieved through functional form, although we also
experimented with exclusion restrictions based on competition measures.28 As in the previous
speciﬁcations, the coeﬃcients of interest are β1, β2,a n dβ3. The interpretation of β1 is the
percent change in the average amount of new long-term debt between an individual eligible
for the maximum subsidy who chooses to acquire long-term debt after the 1998 reform and
another individual with the same characteristics who chooses to acquire prior to the reform.29
28We experimented including in the selection equation: number of bank agencies and number of banks in
the NUTS-III level. The identifying assumption in that speciﬁcation is that banks compete for customers at
the NUTS-III level, and increased competition raises the availability of debt, but that, conditional on prices
of houses, increased competition does not aﬀect the amount of mortgage desired.
29This interpretation can be viewed as supported by a structural model in which Iit denotes the marginal
utility of borrowing net of costs, and logdit is the desired amount of debt. See Angrist (2001) for a critical
review of the assumptions in this model.
17If the removal of the subsidy had any eﬀect on the desired amount of debt, the sign of the
coeﬃcients β1, β2,a n dβ3 would be negative.
5 Empirical evidence
5.1 Experiments using variation across eligible groups and time
Columns (1) through (3) in Table 3 present a simple diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences analysis with
the proportion of borrowers. The estimate in Column 1, row 2 is .045. It suggests that
the probability of signing a loan in a given year, for an individual eligible for the maximum
subsidy, prior to the reform was 4.5 percent. That probability rose to 6.3 percent after the
reform (Column 1, row 1). The increase after 1999 was .018 (Column 1, row 3), very similar to
the corresponding number for non-eligibles, 1.6 percent (Column 2, row 3). The diﬀerences-
in-diﬀerences estimate is .002, positive, small and non-signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero.30 Yet,
as discussed in Section 3, the diﬀs-in-diﬀse v i d e n c ei sn o tt h em o s ta p p r o p r i a t es p e c i ﬁcation to
test for the impact of the 1999 reform on the probability of holding debt, as it is constraining
the eﬀects of the reform to be constant among groups that are aﬀected and others that are
not (groups living in “high-” and “low-” price regions, respectively.)
Columns (4) through (6) in Table 3 present a simple diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence analysis of
the average amount of initial debt, exploiting two sources of variation to identify the eﬀect
of the CB program. Panel A shows the diﬀerence between an average individual debt for
eligible group 1 and non-eligibles before and after the reform. Each cell contains the average
debt within the eligibility group, including individuals who do not have debt. For eligibles,
the diﬀerence between the post- and pre-reform initial debt is 238 euros (Column 4, row
3). The corresponding diﬀerence for the non-eligible group is 844 euros (Column 5, row 3).
Hence, even though eligibles as a group signed slightly higher initial loans, the increase was
smaller than the increase for non-eligibles, who were not aﬀected by the reform. Panels B and
C present the comparison between the average initial loans for the other classes of eligibles
and non-eligibles. These results are consistent with negative, signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero
30The basic results in Table 3 of the response of the probability of signing a new loan to changes in the
interest rate do not change when we introduce covariates. For brevity, we do not include the estimates of OLS
and Probit models.
18eﬀects of the reform on the amount of initial long-term debt. Nevertheless, these results mix
both the impact on the probability of signing new debt and the amount of initial debt signed.
5.2 Experiments using variation across eligible groups, time and
county
This subsection presents the results of estimating model (2). That speciﬁcation allows for
diﬀerent responses to the change in interest rates for individuals living in high and low price
counties.
The ﬁrst column of Table 5 shows OLS estimates of model (2) without adding additional
covariates X. The constant term is the pre-reform probability of signing a new loan among
non-eligibles in high-price counties. The coeﬃcient of the interaction between ELIG_1,
AFTER and HIGHPRICE in the ﬁrst column is -.052. The standard error, corrected for
heteroskedasticity and arbitrary correlation within observations from the same individuals
is .029.31 The magnitude of the coeﬃcient implies a 5.2 percent fall of the probability of
signing a new loan among individuals eligible for the maximum subsidy who were living in
high price regions one year before signing the loan. The results for the ﬁrst eligible group do
not change substantially when we include additional covariates (columns (2) and (3).) The
corresponding estimate of the coeﬃcient of the interaction between ELIG_2, AFTER and
HIGHPRICE is -.10 (standard error: .042). The estimate is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero
at the 2 percent conﬁdence level. The magnitude of the OLS coeﬃcient for the second group
suggests a relative fall of 10% in the probability of signing a new loan among eligibles for the
16% subsidy. The magnitude of the coeﬃcient is larger than in the previous case. The result
is somewhat surprising, given that according to the computations in Table 1, the eligibility
group 2 was exposed to an increase in the interest rate of 16 percent of interest rate payments,
while the ﬁrst group was exposed to a 24 percent increase. A possible explanation is that
individuals eligible for the class 1 subsidy are more likely to adjust in high price counties by
31We include a correction for autocorrelation within observations from the same individual. Bertrand, Duﬂo
and Mullainathan (2002) argue that, due to autocorrelation in the treatment and outcome variables, standard
errors should allow for autocorrelation within treatment units. The time period we use is relatively short,
four years, hence we do not include further corrections than individuals. Correcting for arbitrary correlation
within counties instead of individuals increases the estimated standard errors of the variables of interest by 10
percent.
19purchasing houses at the ceiling than eligibles for class 2, as they have less income on average.
An alternative explanation is that individuals eligible for the highest subsidy are more likely to
be liquidity constrained than individuals eligible for the class 2 subsidy. Hence, their borrowing
behavior is less responsive to changes in the interest rate than that of higher income groups.32
Finally, the estimate in column (1) for ELIG_3, AFTER and HIGHPRICE is negative,
imprecise and not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. The point estimate suggests a 4 percent
fall in the probability of signing a new loan, a similar magnitude to the point estimate for
group 1.
Column (4) in Table 4 is a Probit speciﬁcation. The coeﬃcient of ELIG_1 ∗ AFTER ∗
HIGHPRICE denotes the diﬀerential change in the probability of signing a new loan between
an eligible individual in a high-price county and another individual in a low-price county,
holding the rest of the covariates at their average. The magnitude of the coeﬃcient suggests
a 2.5 percent fall in the probability of signing a new loan, and the standard error is .017.
The eﬀect is signiﬁcant at the 12% conﬁdence level. The pattern for the second eligibility
group is also smaller than in the OLS speciﬁcation -.051 (standard error: .013,) signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero at the 1 percent conﬁdence level. These magnitudes almost halve those
implied by the OLS results. To further assess the extent to which non-linearities and the point
chosen to evaluate the probability in the Probit speciﬁcation are driving the discrepancy in
the estimates, we have constructed the parameter reported in the OLS speciﬁcation.
γ =[ ∆elig_highP(D =1 |ELIG,PRICE,AFTER) −
∆non_el_highP(D =1 |ELIG,PRICE,AFTER)] −
[∆elig_lowpriceP(D =1 |ELIG,PRICE,AFTER) −
∆non_el_lowpriceP(D =1 |ELIG,PRICE,AFTER)] (4)
In this expression, for example, ∆elig_highP(D =1 |ELIG,PRICE,AFTER) denotes the
diﬀerence between the pre- and post-reform probabilities of signing a new loan for eligible
32Attanasio et al. (2000) illustrate in a durable good context that the elasticity of the amount borrowed
by liquidity constrained households to changes in the interest rate is smaller in absolute value than that of
households with free access to the debt market. Jappelli (1990) provides evidence from the US that households
headed by younger individuals with low income are more likely to be denied credit.
20individuals in high price counties. The probabilities P(D =1 |ELIG,PRICE,AFTER) are
constructed using a Probit speciﬁcation, and the standard errors are calculated using the
delta method. For class 1, we have a value of the parameter of -.055 in a speciﬁcation without
covariates (standard error: .03). The corresponding estimate for group 2 is -.11 (standard
error: .04). These magnitudes are very similar to the OLS result presented in the ﬁrst column
of Table 7. Once we compute comparable estimates, the Probit and OLS methods in estimating
model (2) yield similar estimates of the eﬀect of the reform on the probability of holding debt.
To further quantify the relationship between interest rates and the probability of signing
a new loan, we have run the following regression:
1(Dit > 0) = δ0 + δ1 ln(INT_RATEit)+
j=3 X
j=1







β8+iEL_Ji ∗ AFTERt +
j=3 X
j=1
β11+iEL_Ji ∗ H_Pi + β
0Xit + θi + ηit (5)
In the expression above, INT_RATEi denotes the interest rate. We assume that all
individuals face the same pre-subsidy interest rate of 8%, and that the subsidy is applied to
all eligible individuals. Finally, we assume that only eligible individuals living in high price
regions lost access to the subsidy. The expression above implicitly constrains the response of
borrowing behavior to the change in the interest rate to be constant across eligible groups.
The parameter of interest is δ1, which measures the response of the probability to borrow to a
percentage increase in the interest rate. The estimate from that speciﬁcation is -.16 (standard
error: .09). It is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at the 8 percent conﬁdence level. Given that
the probability that an eligible in a high price county signed a loan prior to the reform was
5.5 percent, the estimate translates into an elasticity of 2.9. At face value, the estimate is
large, compared to evidence on other types of debt. Gross and Souleles (2002) and Alessie et
al. (2001) ﬁnd elasticities of short-term debt amount to the interest rate of 1.3. Gary-Bobo
and Larribeau (2003) use a sample of mortgage loans in France, and estimate the elasticity
of the mortgage amount to the interest rate between 2 and 2.7, closer to our estimate. Yet,
21the studies mentioned analyze the response of the debt amount to the interest rate, which
is likely to be less responsive to interest rate changes than the probability of getting new
debt. Poterba (2001) summarizes the evidence on the responses household portfolios to tax
incentives and that the extensive margin is more responsive to changes in after-tax returns
than the intensive margin.
Our results also diﬀer from other recent research from Europe. For example, Jappelli and
Pistaferri (2002), exploit a tax reform in Italy between 1992 and 1994 that increased the after-
tax interest rate for high-income households and reduced it for low income-households and do
not ﬁnd evidence that changes in the incentive to borrow aﬀect the probability of getting a
mortgage. We ﬁnd two explanations for the divergence between their results and ours. The
ﬁrst is the availability of information about the program. Jappelli and Pistaferri stress that
Italian households lack ﬁnancial sophistication. Conversely, the CB program involved the
participation of banks, which are informed agents, and could advise their customers about the
availability of the program. The second explanation is related to the diﬀerence in the datasets,
as JP restrict themselves to heads of households, and use indicators of whether the individual
holds any debt, rather than if the individual signed a new loan in the period. We ran model
(2) using a dependent variable that takes value 1 if the individual holds long-term debt and
zero otherwise. The coeﬃcients were negative, imprecise, and not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero.
Table 5 presents some sensitivity results. In Column 1, we include individuals living in
counties for which we could not obtain the increase in prices between 1998 and 2001. We
assigned an increase in the prices of 17%, the country average for the period. In Column 2,
we raise the minimum loan to 7,500, rather than 5,000. Finally, in Column 3 we recompute
eligibility excluding from the computation of family size children between 1 and 2 years of
age. The idea is to avoid strategic fertility decisions in 1998 to qualify for the program. The
results in these speciﬁcations are similar to our baseline speciﬁcation.
5.2.1 Eﬀect on co-residing adults
The Portuguese housing market shares common features with other Southern European mar-
kets, like a low percentage of young individuals living in rented houses, and a substantial
22fraction of young households co-residing with their parents.33 The availability of parental
help through housing services can make young adults able to delay “nest-leaving” in response
to changes in the interest rate, so that their elasticity of borrowing decisions to its price is
specially large. Conversely, older adults may have a demand for housing services and borrow-
ing decisions that responds to demographic variables, like family size. In Table 6, we run OLS
regressions for the restricted subsample of individuals who reside with their parents. The re-
sults suggest that the 1999 reform aﬀected more the borrowing behavior of individuals residing
with their parents. For the group eligible for the maximum subsidy, the relative proportion of
borrowers in high-price counties fell by almost 11 percent (signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at
the 5 percent level.) The results for the other groups are in that order of magnitude, but more
imprecise, as the number of loans for those groups is relatively small. Hence, within individ-
uals eligible for the maximum subsidy, the eﬀects of the 1999 reform seem to be concentrated
among co-residing adults.34
5.3 Other results: The amount of debt
N e x t ,w ea n a l y z et h ee ﬀect of the interest rate reduction on the amount of debt signed. We
expect the 1999 reform to reduce the amount of debt among eligibles, as this group now faces
t h ec h o i c eb e t w e e nﬁnancing the purchase of a house with m a r k e tv a l u ea b o v et h ec e i l i n ga n d
buying a cheaper house ﬁnanced by a CB loan. Even if the response of the demand for housing
services to the interest rate is zero, the presence of a ceiling may induce individuals to reduce
their demand for housing services to gain access to the CB program.
Table 7 presents estimates of model (3) using both ordinary least squares on the sample
of individuals who have signed a loan during the year of the interview. Given that an OLS
speciﬁcation does not take into account the trunca t i o ni nt h ed e p e n d e n tv a r i a b l e ,w ea l s o
report coeﬃcients from a Maximum Likelihood speciﬁcation.35 The interpretation of the
33See Manacorda and Moretti (2001), or Martínez-Granado and Ruiz-Castillo (2002) for evidence about
co-residence in Italy and Spain, respectively.
34We have also split the sample by age, namely by principal earners younger than 35 and principal earners
older than 35. The results (not shown) suggest that the change in the interest rates had greater eﬀects for
individuals below age 35.
35Following most of the literature on wealth and savings, we choose a speciﬁcation in logarithms. The reason
is that interest rates were falling for most of our sample period. Given that the average debt varied across
groups (see Table III), a speciﬁcation in levels can lead to a spuriously negative eﬀect of the reform. Assume
23coeﬃcient of ELIG_1 ∗ AFTERt is the percentage diﬀerence in the change in the amount
of initial long-term debt of eligible individuals who choose to acquire new debt, relative to
the change in the same amount held by non-eligibles, holding constant the set of covariates
presented in Table 4. Our preferred speciﬁcation in Table 7 is the estimation of model (3)
by Maximum Likelihood, which is reported in the second column. The point estimate of
the coeﬃcient of ELIG_1 ∗ AFTERt is -.32 (standard error: .13,) suggesting that among
eligibles for the maximum subsidy, the initial loan amount diminished by 32% with respect to
non-eligibles. The estimate of ELIG_1 ∗ AFTERt in column (1) of Table 9 shows virtually
identical results in an OLS speciﬁcation. The coeﬃcient of ELIG_2∗AFTERt in the second
column of Table 7 implies a percentage reduction in the average amount of debt of 49 percent.
The point estimate is -.496( standard error: .20) is larger than for the ﬁrst group. The point
estimate for the combined third and fourth eligibility groups is positive and not signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero.
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 7 allow for diﬀerent responses across high- and low- price
counties. In the OLS speciﬁcation, the coeﬃcient of the interaction between ELIG_1 ∗
AFTERt∗HIGHPRICE is .098 (standard error: .27). We do not ﬁnd evidence for a relative
fall in the amount of debt signed by eligibles in high price counties. A possible explanation
for this result is that most individuals in low price counties responded to the reform by
purchasing houses at the ceiling set by the 1999 reform, while in high price counties, a share
of individuals responded by purchasing houses at the ceiling (and hence reducing their initial
debt) and another share of individuals chose not to purchase.
6 Robustness Checks
6.1 Falsiﬁcation exercises.
Even if the 1998 reform had no eﬀects on the propensity to borrow, the coeﬃcients in model
(2) could pick up diﬀerential trends in borrowing behavior between eligibles and non-eligibles
that the program has no eﬀect and that, in response to a fall in the interest rate, all households increase their
debt by a ﬁxed percentage. A speciﬁcation in levels would ﬁnd lower growth in the amount of debt among
eligibles, suggesting a negative eﬀect of the reform. See Engen and Gale (2000) for a similar reasoning when
evaluating whether 401(k) programs have increased savings in the US.
24in high price areas. Throughout the late 1990s, the banking industry in Portugal became
more competitive, especially in high-price areas (Standard and Poor’s ratings direct report,
2002). The increase in competition may have created a diﬀerent trend in high-price areas if
banks competed to oﬀer debt to high-income individuals, most likely to be ineligible for the
CB program.
To examine whether or not any pre-existing diﬀerential trend underlies our results, we
created a “fake” reform in 1998. For this exercise, we used the 1998 and 1999 waves of the
IE, plus additional information on the CRC debt. In principle, we have only four quarterly
surveys of pre-reform data. (the four surveys in 1998). Yet, we know the history of debt of
individuals from 1995. Hence, we can establish whether or not an individual interviewed in
the 1998 wave signed a loan during the 1997 wave. We can also establish whether or not
an individual interviewed in the 1999 wave signed a loan during the 1998 wave. In order to
establish if these individuals qualiﬁed for the CB loan at the time of signing the loan, we
recomputed eligibility at that time. We can establish family size in the previous year using
information on the dates of birth of the members of the family and not counting members
born by the time of the period in which the loan was subscribed. As for income, we do not
know the value of income at the time of the interview. Hence, we deﬂated current income
using the growth rate in the minimum wage in Portugal.
Next, we ran another version of model (2), but now assigning a value of 1 to the variable
AFTERt if the loan was signed in 1998, when the CB program did not impose any restric-
tion on the value of the house purchased. The interaction between ELIG_1, AFTER and
HIGHPRICE should pick up any diﬀerential pre-reform trend in the borrowing behavior
among eligibles. The second column in Table 8 shows the OLS estimates of that model. The
coeﬃcient of the interaction between ELIG_1, AFTER and HIGHPRICE is -.012 (.019).
It is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at any popular conﬁdence level. The corresponding
coeﬃcient in Table 4 was -.055, with a standard error of .029. The coeﬃcient of the inter-
action between ELIG_2, AFTER and HIGHPRICE is .008 (the standard error is .03.)
A non-linear Probit speciﬁcation shows estimates for the ﬁrst group that range between .009
(standard error: .009) and .011 (standard error: .01). From this evidence, we interpret that
25pre-existing trends are not likely to drive the results in Table 4.36
6.2 Did the CB program aﬀect real estate prices?
Subsidies to housing are often criticized for resulting in higher prices of real estate without
increasing home ownership. The reason is that the supply in this market is either inelastic
(Glaeser and Shapiro, 2002) or adjusts slowly (Poterba, 1984). In the previous analysis, we
have focused on a demand-side analysis, but the CB program could have resulted in increases
in real estate prices, especially in the type of housing demanded by eligibles. In this section,
we discuss the impact of the CB program on real estate prices in two diﬀerent ways. First,
we discuss the aggregate relationship between measures of use of the CB program and the
evolution of real estate prices. Second, we examine the county-level relationship between the
evolution of real estate prices in the 1995 - 1998 period and eligibility for the CB program.
Figure 3 presents the steady increase in the quality-unadjusted price of real estate from
1989 to the end of 2001. First, while this period coincides with the expansion of the CB
program, it must be taken into account that the interest rate also fell steadily during the
decade, and per capita income increased. Second, according to Figure 1, the period of higher
increase in the value of new debt corresponds to relatively moderate increases in the real estate
prices. From 1995-1998, the amount of new loans increased at an average annual rate of 41
percent, while the average yearly increase for the 1991-2001 period was 32 percent. On the
other hand, real estate prices increased at an annual rate of 6.2 percent over the 1990-2001
period and 3.2 percent during the 1995-1998 period. Moreover, after the 1999 reform, the real
estate prices continued to increase despite the decrease in the value of total loans, which is
not consistent with the assumption of a rigid supply of real estate. Figure 3 documents an
annual increase of 6.4 percent in real estate prices during the 1999 to 2001 period, while, as
highlighted in Figure 1, there was a signiﬁcant decrease in the annual amount of new loans
36Another potential problem is a mechanical diﬀerential trend between non-eligibles and eligibles. Assume
that we observe single individuals living with their parents, being eligible for the program, and with no
mortgage. These individuals marry, pool incomes, becoming non-eligible, and get a mortgage. The reform
could not have any eﬀect, but still we would observe a negative trend among eligibles. We followed the same
strategy above, to detect any pre-reform trend between eligibles and non-eligibles as a group. The coeﬃcient
estimate for the interaction of ELIG_1, AFTER and HIGHPRICE was -.01 (standard error: .008). The
corresponding interactions for groups 2 and 3 were -.01 (.014) and .01 (.015), respectively.
26after the reform (the amount of new loans decreased by 12.7 percent in 2000 and by 5.6 percent
in 2001).
T h ep r e v i o u sa n a l y s i sr e ﬂects only country trends, and does not quantify the relationship
between real estate and the use of the CB program. We have analyzed the relationship
between eligibility for the CB program pre-reform and the increase in the price of real estate
between 1995 and 1998 — the years of expansion of the CB program, using variation in the
proportion of eligibles across counties. Our identifying assumption is that if the CB program
had an impact on the prices of real estate, counties with a higher proportion of eligibles should
experience overall higher growth in house prices, holding income of the county constant. Using
i n f o r m a t i o no n8 6c o u n t i e s ,w ed on o tﬁnd that the proportion of eligibles in the county aﬀects
the increase in real estate prices.37
In summary, we interpret that regional variation in eligibility does not seem to explain
diﬀerences in the increase of real estate prices. We infer that the increase in housing prices
from the 1990-2001 has been general across all counties, independently of the proportion of
the eligible group of individuals living in a particular county. Hence, our strategy of allowing
for a time trend should capture the eﬀect of the increase in prices.
7C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we have used matched data on administrative records of individual debt and
survey data to estimate the eﬀect of changes in the mortgage interest rate on long-term
household borrowing. Our identiﬁcation strategy relies on the reform of a large program that
subsidized loans to young and low income individuals. That reform introduced a ceiling in the
price of the house that could be ﬁnanced through the program, and we argue that it created
37The results of the regression were the following (standard error of the estimated coeﬃcients in parentheses).
The number of observations was 86. The R2 of the regression is 0.38. In the regression PELIG_1 represents
the ration between the eligibility of class 1 and the non-eligibles, in the county (we have also ran alternative





+.143(.069)INCOME − .004(.011)POPULATION− .0003(.00007) ∗ PRICE_95
27a discontinuity in the incentives to borrow among several groups of the population.
We have two main ﬁndings. The elasticity of the probability of mortgage borrowing to a
change in the interest rate is large and negative: an increase in the interest rate of 1 percent
reduces the probability of borrowing by 2.9 percent. That elasticity is higher for young adults
residing with their parents. Second, we also ﬁnd that the amount borrowed responds negatively
to the change in the interest rate, although it is diﬃcult to interpret the magnitude of the
response. These results diﬀer from previous studies using tax reforms. We argue that the
sources of discrepancy may come from the widespread availability of information about the
CB program we consider, but also diﬀerences in the quality of the data may matter.
Our results suggest that individual borrowing among groups at the margin of home own-
ership, such as the young and (relatively) low income individuals does respond to changes
in the interest rate. Public programs that target these groups can be a powerful tool to in-
crease access to long - term debt markets and shape their savings decisions. Our data cannot
provide direct evidence of whether or not these programs actually increase total household
saving. That is a line for future research.
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Appendix A. Data appendix
In this appendix we describe the construction of income variable and eligibility measures.
A.0.1 Construction of pre-tax income
Individuals are eligible if their adjusted pre-tax taxable income is below a certain threshold.
For each quarter, the Inquerito ao Emprego asks each individual in the household about his or
her labor income source, unemplyment beneﬁt, income from self-employment and retirement
income.
30The exact questions (for employed individuals) are:
• “What is the net monthly earnings in your main job (in Portuguese currency - escudos)”
• “What is the net amount on earnings additionally to your main job, received with a
periodicity above the month, over the last 12 months”
For unemployed individuals:
• “What is the monthly net amount of unemployment beneﬁts or other monthly welfare
income (in euro).”
For retired individuals:
• “What is the monthly net amount of your pension (in euro).”
We converted monthly amounts into euro. If an individual reported several diﬀerent earn-
ings every quarter during the same year, we averaged them. To recover yearly income, we
multiplied the amount by 14. For income with periodicity over the month, we took the max-
imum reported over the year. For married couples, we added all available income measures
of the head and spouse, but did not include the earnings of any other member. We infered
g r o s si n c o m eb yu s i n gt h ef a c tt h a tS o c i a lS e c u r i t yc o n t r i b u t i o n sa m o u n tt o1 1 %o fe a r n i n g s
in Portugal, and the standard withholding rules.
A.0.2 Family size
Next, we compute family size, adding up the number of individuals in the household, but
excluding young adults who are sons or daughters of the head above age 18 and who re-
port positive income. As mentioned in the text, these individuals may choose to ﬁle taxes
individually. Their imputed family size is 1.
A.0.3 Eligibility
To determine eligibility, the Credito Boniﬁcado introduced a measure of “adjusted household
income.” A family of one member had its total yearly income multiplied by 1.3. The income of
31a two-person family was not corrected. A three-person family adjusted income by substracting
165,000 escudos (823 euro). The corresponding deductions for four, ﬁve and more than ﬁve
member families was 330,000, 495,000 and 660,000 escudos, respectively.
Families were eligible for the maximum subsidy if their adjusted yearly income exceeded
3.25 times the minimum yearly wage, which was obtained by multiplying the minimum
monthly wage by 14. The minimum monthly wage in Portugal was 293.79 euro in 1998,
305.76 euro in 1999, 318.23 euro in 2000 and 334.19 euro in 2001.
Appendix B. Theory appendix (not intended for publication)
This appendix proves the claims made in Section 3. The ﬁrst claim states that because of the
ceiling introduced by the 1999 reform, the comparison of the evolution of borrowers before
and after the reform, holding prices constant, underestimates the eﬀect of a change in the
interest rate on the probability of borrowing. First, we characterize the determinants of the
choice to borrow using a speciﬁc utility function. Second, we analyze the possible responses
to a change in the budget constraint like that in the 1999 reform (which can be observed in
the data.) Finally, we relate both magnitudes. The second claim states that, if the elasticity
of expenditure in housing services with respect to the price p is positive, the introduction of
a ceiling aﬀects a larger share of consumers in high price regions than in low-price regions.















c1 denotes ﬁrst period consumption, h housing services and c2 second period consumption. γ
m e a s u r e st h e( r e l a t i v e )p r e f e r e n c ef o rhousing services. We further assume that σ>ρ>1.
The consumer receives an exogenous amount of income y1 in the ﬁrst period, and y2 in the
second. In the ﬁrst period, the consumer may choose whether or not to acquire housing
services h at a price per unit p. If the consumer does not acquire housing services, he or she
enjoys a consumption level of h We ignore depreciation or revaluation of the housing stock,
as well as other ownership costs, so an investment in a unit of housing today is worth p in the
second period. The consumer can ask for a loan m for each unit of housing services, at an
32interest rate r,a n dm cannot exceed p .T h eﬁrst-period budget constraint is the following
c1 + s +( p − m)h = y1 (B.2)
s denotes savings. It can be shown that the consumer cannot borrow and lend at the same
time. The second-period budget constraint is the following
c2 +( 1+r)hm = y2 + ph + s(1 + r) (B.3)
r denotes the interest rate, and y2 is second period income. Combining both budget
constraints, one can get the expression for the budget constraint in Section 3. Finally, we
assume that γ is distributed continuously in the interval [γ,γ] with a density function dF(γ).
Maximizing the utility function subject to the (linear) budget constraint (BC), one can get the
optimal amount for the consumption of housing services, h∗, of period 1 good c∗
1 and period
2 good c∗


















Hence, h∗ = h(γ,r,p,y1 +
y2
1+r) diﬀerentiating the expression, one can obtain the following
comparative statics: ∂h∗
∂γ > 0, ∂h∗
∂r < 0 and ∂h∗
∂p < 0. The optimal demand for mortgage debt




(y2 + ph∗)+( 1+r)
1
ρ(ph∗ − y1)




It can be shown that an increase in y1 coupled with a fall in
y2
1+r that keeps y1 +
y2
1+r
constant reduces m∗h∗. Hence, if y1 is suﬃciently small compared to y2 the individual will
borrow. Throughout the appendix, we assume that this is the case, so we focus the analysis
on individuals who purchase a house borrowing in the mortgage market. We also drop y1,
y2
1+r
as arguments of the optimal choices. Also,
∂(h∗m∗)
∂r < 0 provided that ρ>1 The utility from













Where the subscript γ indexes the diﬀerent utility levels of individuals with diﬀerent values
of γ and s can only be positive under our assumptions. The indirect utility function associated






















The consumer chooses to participate in the housing market and borrow only if, for given











1+r]) b e c o m e sl e s sl i k e l y





1+r] falls with the interest rate if the
individual is a borrower.38 Conversely, if the consumer does not acquire housing services,
an increase in the interest rate cannot decrease the utility, as under our assumptions, agents









Under the conditions above, for each γ the term within the integral is negative. Hence,
∂P(m∗h∗>0)
∂r < 0. Now, the 1999 reform increased the interest rate only if the value of the




























Let the values h∗∗, c∗∗
1 and c∗∗
2 be the values that maximize B.1 subject to the (non-linear)
1999 budget constraint formed by BC1 and BC2. We denote the utility of consuming L by
38Diﬀerentiating the indirect utility function with respect to r and using Roy’s identity, one gets
∂Vγ
∂r =




1+r). If the individual borrows, (c2 − ph − y2) is negative.
34V cap. In our data, we observe the equilibrium choices at the pre-reform interest rate, with
a linear budget constraint, P(m∗h∗ > 0|γ,p,rpre) and the post-reform choices P(m∗∗h∗∗ >
0|γ,p,rpost), with the non-linear budget constraints BC1 and BC2.39 In the next claim, we
relate these magnitudes to the parameter B.9.
Claim 1 Holding p and the distribution of preferences constant, the comparison of borrowers
before and after the 1999 reform underestimates the response of the probability of borrowing
to a change in the interest rate.
• Let γ0 be such that h∗(γ0,p,r pre)=L
p.F o rγ :[ γ,γ0] h∗∗(p,rpost)=h∗(p,rpre).I no t h e r
words, the post-reform choice of whether or not to participate in the housing market is
the same as the pre-reform choice for individuals whose demand of housing services at
the pre-reform interest rate is below the 1999 ceiling. Hence:
Z γ0
γ
P(m∗∗h∗∗ > 0|γ,p,rpost) − P(m∗h∗∗ > 0|γ,p,rpre)
rpost − rpre
dF(γ)=0 (B.10)




γ . γ1 exceeds γ0 because h(γ,p,r) increases
with γ and decreases in r. For a subset of individuals whose γ lies in the interval [γ0,γ1]
, the choice between participating in the housing market and not participating can be
distorted toward going to the ceiling and not leaving the housing market. Namely, this
group exists if parameters are such that Vγ[ 1
1+rpost,
prpost
1+rpost] < U<V cap
γ .
Hence, for γ ∈ [γ,γ1] the observed
P(m∗∗>0|γ,p,rpost)−P(m∗>0|γ,p,rpre)
rpost−rpre is a lower bound of
∂P(mh>0)
∂r
• Finally, for individuals for whom γ ∈ [γ1,γ], h∗(p,rpost,γ) > L




>Vcap t h ec h o i c eb e t w e e np a r t i c i p a t i n gi nt h ehousing market and not participating is
not aﬀected by the introduction of a ceiling.
39We keep the following convention. An asterisk * over a control variable denotes that it solves the problem
of maximizing the utility function subject to the linear budget constraint BC (at either interest rate rpre or
rpost. Two asterisks denote that it maximizes the utility function subject to the non-linear budget constraint
BC1 and BC2
35Claim 2 If σ>ρ , and the distribution of the parameter γ i st h es a m ei nal o wa n di na
high- price region, the introduction of a ceiling to qualify for the subsidy makes case 1 more
likely in a low price region.
Assume we have two regions. In region 1, the price of the real estate is plow.I nr e g i o n2 ,
the price is phigh Assume also that in both regions, the same preferences γ are distributed
according to the same distribution function dF(γ). Also, all individuals face the same interest
rate r First, if σ>ρ , then the derivative of housing services with respect to the price of real





































∂p > 0. (a positive elasticity of the expenditure
in housing services with respect to the price p.) Given two identical individuals with the same
preferences for housing γ, the individual in region 2 spends a larger share of her budget in
housing than the individual in region 1, that is, phighh∗(γ,phigh,r pre) >p lowh∗(γ,plow,r pre).
Hence, the distribution of expenditure on housing ph is “shifted to the right” in region 2
with respect to region 1. An uniform ceiling will aﬀect the decisions of a larger share of the
population in the high price region.
36Figure 1
Evolution of Total Value of New Loans Under the Subsidy and General Regimes
The ﬁgure presents the evolution of the total amount of new loans granted under the subsidized regime and the non-subsidized





















Subsidized Regime General Regime - no subsidy Total DebtFigure 2
The ﬁgure present the eﬀect of the 1999 reform of the CB program on the budget constraint of an individual eligible for the
maximum subsidy The solid line represents the budget constraint of an eligible household before the 1998 reform. The dotted































Utility level pre-reform 
ŪFigure 3
Real Estate Price Index and Overall Interest Rate on Long-Term Loans
Source of the real estate price index: computed by the ﬁrm Conﬁdencial Imobiliario Lda. The (monthly) index aggregates real
estate prices for a set of real estate agencies. The value of the index in January 1989 is 100. The interest rate is the aggregate
level of interest rate on outstanding 5-year maturity loans or longer that were granted to households or emigrants, computed by























































































































































) Real Estate Price Index
Interest RateTable 1
Savings Associated with the Credito Boniﬁcado Program
Columns (2) through (5) report simulated yearly payments of a 25-year mortgage without any subsidy. We asssume that there
is no inﬂation and a constant interest rate of 8% throughout the 25-year loan. The installment plan is determined for constant
annual payments. Column (7) presents (non-discounted to period zero) payments of the same mortgage, for a person eligible for
class I subsidy.
Age loan Debt Paymt R−(age_loan) Disc. Paymt % Subsidy Paymt. CB
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)=(4)*(3) (6) (7)=(3)-subsidy
0 48000
1 47400 4440 0.926 4111 0.44 2751
2 46751 4440 0.857 3807 0.44 2772
3 46051 4440 0.794 3525 0.43 2832
4 45295 4440 0.735 3264 0.42 2893
5 44478 4440 0.681 3022 0.41 2955
6 43596 4440 0.630 2798 0.39 3053
7 42643 4440 0.583 2591 0.37 3150
8 41614 4440 0.540 2399 0.35 3246
9 40503 4440 0.500 2221 0.33 3342
10 39303 4440 0.463 2057 0.31 3436
11 38007 4440 0.429 1904 0.29 3529
12 36607 4440 0.397 1763 0.27 3619
13 35095 4440 0.368 1633 0.25 3708
14 33463 4440 0.340 1512 0.23 3795
15 31699 4440 0.315 1400 0.21 3878
16 29795 4440 0.292 1296 0.19 3959
17 27738 4440 0.270 1200 0.17 4035
18 25517 4440 0.250 1111 0.15 4107
19 23118 4440 0.232 1029 0.13 4175
20 20527 4440 0.215 953 0.11 4237
21 17729 4440 0.199 882 0.09 4293
22 14707 4440 0.184 817 0.07 4341
23 11443 4440 0.170 756 0.05 4382
24 7918 4440 0.158 700 0.03 4413
25 4111 4440 0.146 648 0.01 4434










Ratio [Class I] = Payment after subsidy 1 /Discounted Paymt =36,408/48,000 = 0.76
Ratio [Class II] = Payment after subsidy 2 /Discounted Paymt =40,203/48,000 = 0.84
Ratio [Class III] =Payment after subsidy 3 /Discounted Paymt =44,117/48,000 = 0.92
Ratio [Class IV] =Payment after subsidy 4 /Discounted Paymt =46,366/48,000 = 0.97Table 2
Descriptive Statistics of the Main Sample
Income and debt are in 1999 euro. The sample is an unbalanced panel of 13,819 individuals. Each individual contributes with
1 observation in a given year, and at most 2 observations to the whole sample. Married households contribute one observation
per year. Individuals with positive income co-residing with their parents contribute one observation per year. For individuals in
their own household, family size excludes co-residing adults above 18 reporting positive income. The report of age, education
or labor market situation corresponds to the main earner, unless otherwise stated. “Lived in a high price county” refers to the
year prior to the interview. “New loan” refers to loans of maturity longer than one year.
Class 1 Class 2 Classes III-IV Non Eligible Whole Sample
Number of observations: 11,238 1,294 1,371 2,684 16,587
Percentage in the whole sample 68.0% 7.8% 8.3% 16.1% 100.0%
Mean StDev Mean StDev Mean StDev Mean StDev Mean StDev
Signed new loan 0.05 0.23 0.09 0.28 0.11 0.31 0.13 0.34 0.07 0.26
Amount of new loan, if positive 29,225 28,423 27,166 27,482 28,402 27,656 32,920 32,071 29,976 29,359
Gross Yearly Income 9,194 2,838 15,162 959 18,265 1,505 35,460 19,962 14,659 12,710
Family size 2.21 1.37 2.19 1.23 2.23 1.23 2.48 1.31 2.26 1.35
Age 34.01 11.18 35.07 10.29 35.48 9.91 38.85 9.48 35.01 10.90
Married 0.47 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.55 0.50 0.61 0.49 0.51 0.50
Single 0.45 0.50 0.41 0.49 0.39 0.49 0.31 0.46 0.42 0.49
Divorced 0.05 0.23 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.22 0.07 0.25 0.06 0.23
Widow(er) 0.02 0.14 0.05 0.21 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.14
Single female 0.23 0.42 0.19 0.39 0.18 0.38 0.20 0.40 0.22 0.41
Co-resides with parents 0.47 0.50 0.41 0.49 0.38 0.49 0.27 0.44 0.42 0.49
Illiterate 0.04 0.20 0.02 0.14 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.18
Compl. 6th grade basic school 0.63 0.48 0.49 0.50 0.41 0.49 0.16 0.36 0.52 0.50
Basic schooling-vocational training 0.31 0.46 0.39 0.49 0.41 0.49 0.40 0.49 0.33 0.47
College degree 0.02 0.04 0.10 0.30 0.17 0.38 0.44 0.50 0.11 0.31
Works for public Sector 0.06 0.23 0.12 0.33 0.12 0.33 0.22 0.41 0.09 0.29
Part time 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.12 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.14
Secondary earner self-employed 0.04 0.20 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.18 0.04 0.20
Secondary earner does not work 0.15 0.35 0.04 0.21 0.56 0.50 0.04 0.20 0.11 0.32
Lived in high price county 0.49 0.49 0.52 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.62 0.49 0.52 0.50
Average price in county - 1998 82,078 11,163 83,564 12,838 8,578 13,535 123,703 14,328 83,282 12,221Table 3
Diﬀerences-in-diﬀerences Results: Proportion of Borrowers and Average Debt Amount
Means are unweighted. Coeﬃcients and standard errors (in parentheses) for the proportion of borrowers are obtained from
regressing the probability of signing a new loan on a post-reform dummy, eligibility dummies and interaction terms between the
former variables. For the amount of debt regressions, the same covariates are used, and the dependent variable is the amount
of the new loan (zeroes included.) Standard errors in all speciﬁcations are corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation
between observations of the same individual. “Non-eligibles” refers to individuals who do not qualify for the program on the
basis of their income.
Proportion of Borrowers Amount of debt
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A: Eligible group 1: Subsidy reduction of 24%
Eligibles Non-eligibles Diﬀ btw groups Eligibles Non-eligibles Diﬀ btw groups
=(1)-(2) =(1)-(2)
1.After the reform 0.063 0.132 0.069 1,562 4,189 2,627
(0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (102) (207) (231)
2.Before the reform 0.045 0.116 0.071 1,324 3,345 2,021
(0.003) (0.006) (0.007) (116) (235) (262)
3.Diﬀerence within groups 0.018 0.016 0.002 238 844 -606
(0.004) (0.008) (0.009) (154) (313) (349)
Panel B: Eligible group 2: Subsidy reduction of 16%
Eligibles Non-eligibles Diﬀ btw groups Eligibles Non-eligibles Diﬀ btw groups
=(1)-(2) =(1)-(2)
4.After the reform 0.097 0.132 0.035 2,352 4,189 1,837
(0.007) (0.005) (0.009) (300) (207) (365)
5.Before the reform 0.079 0.116 0.037 2,590 3,345 755
(0.009) (0.006) (0.011) (367) (235) (435)
6.Diﬀerence within groups 0.018 0.016 0.002 -238 844 -1,082
(0.012) (0.008) (0.014) (474) (313) (568)
Panel C: Eligible Groups 3 and 4: subsidy reduction 8% and 4%
Eligibles Non-eligibles Diﬀ btw groups Eligibles Non-eligibles Diﬀ btw groups
=(1)-(2) =(1)-(2)
7.After the reform 0.110 0.132 0.022 3,261 4,189 928
(0.009) (0.005) (0.011) (289) (207) (356)
8.Before the reform 0.088 0.116 0.028 2,038 3,345 1,307
(0.012) (0.006) (0.010) (351) (235) (422)
9.Diﬀerence within groups 0.022 0.016 -0.006 1,223 844 -379
(0.013) (0.008) (0.015) (455) (313) (552)Table 4
The Impact of the 1999 Reform on the Probability of Signing a New Loan - OLS Estimations
Coeﬃcients are from OLS estimates of model (2). Standard errors, in parentheses, are corrected for heteroskedasticity and
arbitrary correlation between observations from the same individual in speciﬁcations (1) and (2). In (3), standard errors allow
for autocorrelation within the county. The omitted education group is “completed primary schooling or vocational training”.
The omitted marital status group is “married”. The omitted employment status group is “employed individuals working in
the private sector”. The logarithm of per capita family income is the deviation from sample means. The symbols *, **, ***
denote that the hypothesis of the coeﬃcient being diﬀerent from zero is rejected at the 10%, 5% and 1% signiﬁcance level. The
estimation method is Ordinary Least Squares.
Dependent variable takes value 1 if individual acquired long-term debt during the year, 0 otherwise.
(1) (2) (3)
[No covariates] [Limited Covariates] [County Fixed-eﬀ.]
Coeﬀ.S t . D e v . C o e ﬀ.S t . D e v . C o e ﬀ.S t . D e v .
ELIG1*AFTER*HIGHPRICE -0.052 (0.029)* -0.054 (0.029)* -0.055 (0.032)*
ELIG2*AFTER*HIGHPRICE -0.103 (0.042)** -0.102 (0.042)** -0.094 (0.041)**
ELIG3*AFTER*HIGHPRICE -0.043 (0.044) -0.040 (0.044) -0.039 (0.053)
ELIG1*AFTER 0.032 (0.023) 0.033 (0.023) 0.030 (0.021)
ELIG2*AFTER 0.054 (0.031)* 0.054 (0.031)* 0.045 (0.031)
ELIG3*AFTER 0.014 (0.035) 0.013 (0.034) 0.013 (0.042)
ELIG1*HIGHPRICE 0.031 (0.021) 0.032 (0.021) 0.032 (0.021)
ELIG2*HIGHPRICE 0.071 (0.031)** 0.070 (0.031)** 0.068 (0.029)**
ELIG3*HIGHPRICE 0.019 (0.033) 0.018 (0.033) 0.020 (0.035)
ELIG1 -0.095 (0.017)*** -0.078 (0.017)*** -0.054 (0.016)***
ELIG2 -0.081 (0.023)*** -0.072 (0.023)*** -0.058 (0.024)**
ELIG3 -0.030 (0.026) -0.025 (0.026) -0.018 (0.027)
AFTER -0.021 (0.022) -0.019 (0.022) -0.014 (0.019)
AFTER*HIGHPRICE 0.060 (0.028)** 0.059 (0.028)** 0.056 (0.029)**
HIGHPRICE -0.040 (0.020)** -0.040 (0.020)** 0.000 (0.000)
(Age - 30)/10 0.008 (0.005)* 0.005 (0.005)
(Age - 30)* (Age - 30)/100 -0.022 (0.004)*** -0.020 (0.004)***
(Age - 30)(Age - 30)(Age - 30)/1000 0.004 (0.002)** 0.003 (0.002)*
Single female -0.025 (0.005)*** -0.018 (0.005)***
Number of adults - 2 -0.007 (0.005) -0.010 (0.006)*
Inverse of family size -1/2 -0.072 (0.011)*** -0.284 (0.080)***
Principal earner illiterate -0.043 (0.009)*** -0.036 (0.010)***
Principal earner completed 6th grade -0.019 (0.005)*** -0.017 (0.007)**
Principal earner completed college -0.001 (0.010) -0.007 (0.013)





Principal earner works for public sector 0.013 (0.009)
Principal earner works part time 0.002 (0.011)
Secondary earner self-employed 0.037 (0.013)***
Principal earner not employed -0.011 (0.012)
Secondary earner not employed 0.004 (0.007)
Constant 0.147 (0.016)*** 0.172 (0.018)*** 0.180 (0.012)***
Sample size 16,587
R-squared 0.01 0.03 0.04Table 4 (cont.)
The Impact of the 1999 Reform on the Probability of Signing a New Loan - Probit Estimations
Coeﬃcients are from Probit estimates of model (2), and report the marginal eﬀect of changing the covariate on the probability
of signing a new debt, holding the rest of the covariates at sample means. Standard errors, in parentheses, are corrected for
heteroskedasticity and arbitrary correlation between observations from the same individual in speciﬁcations (1) and (2). In
(3), standard errors allow for autocorrelation within the county. The omitted education group is “completed primary schooling
or vocational training”. The omitted marital status group is “married”. The omitted employment status group is “employed
individuals working in the private sector”. The logarithm of per capita family income is the deviation from sample means. The
symbols *, **, *** denote that the hypothesis of the coeﬃcient being diﬀerent from zero is rejected at the 10%, 5% and 1%
signiﬁcance level. The estimation method is a probit.
Dependent variable takes value 1 if individual acquired long-term debt during the year, 0 otherwise
(4) (5) (6)
[No Covariates] [Limited Covariates] [County Fixed-Eﬀ.]
Coeﬀ.S t . D e v . C o e ﬀ.S t . D e v . C o e ﬀ.S t . D e v .
ELIG1*AFTER*HIGHPRICE -0.025 (0.017) -0.024 (0.016) -0.028 (0.016)*
ELIG2*AFTER*HIGHPRICE -0.050 (0.014)*** -0.047 (0.013)*** -0.043 (0.012)***
ELIG3*AFTER*HIGHPRICE -0.021 (0.023) -0.020 (0.023) -0.025 (0.023)
ELIG1*AFTER 0.027 (0.017) 0.026 (0.016)* 0.026 (0.016)*
ELIG2*AFTER 0.049 (0.036) 0.047 (0.034) 0.039 (0.035)
ELIG3*AFTER 0.005 (0.025) 0.005 (0.023) 0.009 (0.032)
ELIG1*HIGHPRICE 0.014 (0.016) 0.015 (0.016) 0.019 (0.016)
ELIG2*HIGHPRICE 0.060 (0.040)* 0.066 (0.038)* 0.063 (0.037)*
ELIG3*HIGHPRICE 0.008 (0.026) 0.009 (0.025) 0.019 (0.016)
ELIG1 -0.091 (0.015)*** -0.064 (0.014)*** -0.030 (0.012)**
ELIG2 -0.045 (0.010)*** -0.037 (0.011)*** -0.025 (0.015)*
ELIG3 -0.015 (0.015) -0.010 (0.015) -0.006 (0.016)
AFTER -0.013 (0.014) -0.008 (0.013) -0.007 (0.012)
AFTER*HIGHPRICE 0.040 (0.021)** 0.038 (0.020)* 0.037 (0.021)*
HIGHPRICE -0.025 (0.013)** -0.023 (0.012)** -0.07 (0.016)***
(Age - 30)/10 0.014 (0.005)*** 0.010 (0.005)*
(Age - 30)* (Age - 30)/100 -0.029 (0.005)*** -0.024 (0.005)***
(Age - 30)(Age - 30)(Age - 30)/1000 0.007 (0.002)*** 0.005 (0.002)***
Single female -0.027 (0.005)*** -0.020 (0.006)***
Number of adults - 2 -0.010 (0.005)** -0.012 (0.005)**
Inverse of family size -1/2 -0.066 (0.010)*** -0.435 (0.069)***
Principal earner illiterate -0.039 (0.007)*** -0.034 (0.008)***
Principal earner completed 6th grade -0.018 (0.005)*** -0.017 (0.006)***
Principal earner completed college 0.001 (0.007) -0.006 (0.008)
Log. of per capita family income 0.045 (0.007)***




Principal earner works for public sector 0.012 (0.007)*
Principal earner works part time 0.008 (0.012)
Secondary earner self-employed 0.034 (0.012)***
Principal earner not employed -0.010 (0.012)
Secondary earner not employed 0.007 (0.006)
Observations 16,587 16,169
R squared .02 .05 .07Table 5
The Impact of the 1999 Reform on the Probability of Holding Debt - Additional Robustness Checks
Standard errors, in parentheses, are corrected for heteroskedasticity and arbitrary correlation between observations from the
same individual. We use the same set of covariates as in Table 4. The symbols *, **, *** denote that the hypothesis of the
coeﬃcient being diﬀerent from zero is rejected at the 10%, 5% and 1% signiﬁcance level.
Dependent variable takes value 1 if individual acquired long-term debt during the year, 0 otherwise.
Estimation method: OLS OLS OLS
All counties, imputing Minimum loan is set Eligibility measure excludes
real estate inﬂation at 7,500 euro children of age below 2
ELIG1*AFTER*HIGHPRICE -0.038 -0.043 -0.043
(0.023)* (0.024)* (0.026)*
ELIG2*AFTER*HIGHPRICE -0.079 -0.063 -0.085
(0.035)** (0.037)* (0.040)**
ELIG3*AFTER*HIGHPRICE -0.016 -0.005 -0.016
(0.026) (0.027) (0.029)
ELIG1*AFTER 0.017 0.013 0.024
(0.016) (0.018) (0.019)
ELIG2*AFTER 0.038 0.011 0.034
(0.025) (0.026) (0.028)
ELIG3*AFTER 0.000 -0.02 -0.014
(0.017) (0.019) (0.020)
ELIG1*HIGHPRICE 0.021 0.029 0.027
(0.017) (0.018) (0.020)
ELIG2*HIGHPRICE 0.049 0.056 0.060
(0.026)* (0.028)** (0.030)**
ELIG3*HIGHPRICE 0.003 -0.001 0.004
(0.024) (0.025) (0.028)
ELIG1 -0.034 -0.036 -0.045
(0.016)** (0.017)** (0.019)**
ELIG2 -0.032 -0.033 -0.041*
(0.020) (0.021) (0.023)
ELIG3 -0.001 0.007 0.005
(0.017) (0.018) (0.020)
AFTER -0.002 -0.003 -0.01
(0.016) (0.017) (0.018)
AFTER*HIGHPRICE 0.042 0.046 0.046
(0.022)* (0.023)** (0.024)*
HIGHPRICE -0.026 -0.032 0.000
(0.016)* (0.017)* 0.000
Observations 22,970 16,587Table 6
The Impact of the 1999 Reform on the Probability of Holding Debt - Individuals Co-residing with Parents
Coeﬃcients are from OLS estimates of model (2). Standard errors, in parentheses, are corrected for heteroskedasticity and
arbitrary correlation between observations from the same individual in speciﬁcations (1) and (2). In (3), standard errors allow
for autocorrelation within the county. Speciﬁcations (1), (2) and (3) include the covariates listed in Table 4 (not shown.)
Dependent variable takes value 1 if individual acquired long-term debt during the year, 0 otherwise.
Estimation Method : OLS
(1) (2) (3)
[No Covariates] [Full Covariates] [County Fixed-Eﬀ.]
ELIG1*AFTER*HIGHPRICE -0.106 -0.109 -0.110
(0.048)** (0.048)** (0.047)**
ELIG2*AFTER*HIGHPRICE -0.109 -0.109 -0.092
(0.062)* (0.062)* (0.059)
ELIG3*AFTER*HIGHPRICE -0.137 -0.133 -0.133
(0.066)** (0.066)** (0.061)**
ELIG1*AFTER 0.071 0.073 0.068
(0.037)* (0.037)* (0.029)**
ELIG2*AFTER 0.072 0.071 0.054
(0.048) (0.048) (0.036)
ELIG3*AFTER 0.121 0.113 0.113
(0.051)** (0.051)** (0.044)**
ELIG1*HIGHPRICE 0.069 0.075 0.071
(0.038)* (0.038)** (0.033)**
ELIG2*HIGHPRICE 0.066 0.070 0.054
(0.048) (0.048) (0.046)
ELIG3*HIGHPRICE 0.070 0.070 0.066
(0.050) (0.050) (0.040)
ELIG1 -0.120 -0.090 -0.080
(0.032)*** (0.035)** (0.032)**
ELIG2 -0.095 -0.084 -0.064
(0.039)** (0.040)** (0.036)*
ELIG3 -0.095 -0.085 -0.081
(0.040)** (0.040)** (0.032)**
AFTER -0.060 -0.062 -0.055
(0.037) (0.036)* (0.027)**
AFTER*HIGHPRICE 0.100 0.099 0.098
(0.047)** (0.047)** (0.044)**
HIGHPRICE -0.071 -0.072 -0.065
(0.037)* (0.038)* (0.037)*
Observations 7,136 7,137 7,138Table 7
The Impact of the 1999 Reform on the Logarithm of the Amount of New Debt
Standard errors, in parentheses, are not corrected for heteroskedasticity or arbitrary correlation between observations from the
same individual. Covariates have the same interpretation as in Table 4. One, two and three asterisks denotes that the hypothesis
of the coeﬃcient being diﬀerent from zero is rejected at the 10%, 5% and 1% signiﬁcance level.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
[OLS] [Max. Likel.] [OLS] [Max. Lik.]
Coeﬀ.S t . D e v . C o e ﬀ.S t . D e v . C o e ﬀ.S t . D e v . C o e ﬀ.S t . D e v .
ELIG1*AFTER -0.30 (0.130)** -0.322 (0.127)** -0.353 (0.192)* -0.387 (0.194)**
ELIG2*AFTER -0.48 (0.20)** -0.50 (0.205)** -0.79 (0.309)** -0.850 (0.321)***
ELIG3*AFTER 0.15 (0.182) 0.14 (0.19) -0.348 (0.276) -0.304 (0.277)
ELIG1*AFTER*HIGHPRICE 0.098 (0.266) 0.068 (0.260)
ELIG2*AFTER*HIGHPRICE 0.51 (0.400) 0.565 (0.436)
ELIG3*AFTER*HIGHPRICE 0.82 (0.366)** 0.812 (0.375)**
ELIG1 0.22 (0.13) 0.260 (0.141)* 0.23 (0.164) 0.231 (0.176)
ELIG2 0.20 (0.17) 0.221 (0.172) 0.40 (0.248)* 0.524 (0.265)**
ELIG3 -0.17 (0.144) -0.17 (0.152) -0.10 (0.232) -0.002 (0.210)
AFTER 0.10 (0.107) 0.11 (0.102) 0.220 (0.163) 0.259 (0.158)
AFTER*HIGHPRICE 0.173 (0.197) -0.192 (0.198)
HIGHPRICEl 0.008 -0.161 0.021 (0.159)
(Age - 30)/10 0.11 (0.008) 0.08 (0.009) 0.012 (0.008) 0.008 (0.009)
(Age - 30)* (Age - 30)/100 -0.03 (0.001)*** -0.02 (0.001)** -0.003 (0.001)*** -0.002 (0.001)**
(Age-30)(Age-30)(Age-30)/1000 4e-4 (3e-4) 4e-4 (3e-4) 0.000 (0.000) 0.000 (0.000)
Single female 0.14 (0.104) 0.16 (0.11) 0.131 (0.106) 0.165 (0.113)
Number of adults - 2 -0.032 (0.072) -0.01 (0.075) -0.071 (0.076) -0.020 (0.076)
Inverse of family size -1.52 (1.30) -1.34 (1.63) -1.789 (1.299) -1.235 (1.582)
Illiterate 0.152 (0.246) 0.22 (0.24) 0.160 (0.252) 0.223 (0.244)
Completed 6th grade -0.141 (0.065)** -0.128 (0.070) -0.143 (0.066)** -0.126 (0.073)*
College degree -0.025 (0.093) -0.04 (0.093) -0.040 (0.095) -0.050 (0.093)
Log of per capita family income 0.14 (0.134) 0.12 (0.17) 0.134 (0.135) 0.112 (0.163)
Single 0.061 (0.171) 0.10 (0.171) 0.157 (0.190) 0.105 (0.172)
Divorced 0.195 (0.167) 0.24 (0.190) 0.276 (0.176) 0.243 (0.192)
Widow(er) -0.366 (0.295) -0.27 (0.36) -0.370 (0.295) -0.303 (0.359)
Principal earner works for pub sector -0.171 (0.077)** -0.19 (0.085)** -0.174 (0.078)** -0.181 (0.085)**
Principal earner works part time 0.185 (0.191) 0.17 (0.202) 0.178 (0.190) 0.166 (0.200)
Secondary earner self-employed 0.049 (0.111) 0.03 (0.121) 0.085 (0.112) 0.048 (0.125)
Principal earner not employed 0.006 (0.156) 0.01 (0.167) 0.010 (0.161) 0.016 (0.166)
Secondary earner not employed 0.041 (0.088) 0.021 (0.090) 0.058 (0.088) 0.040 (0.089)
Constant
Observations 1,248 16,587 1,248 16,587
R-squared .097 0.1074Table 8
The Impact of a Fake 1998 Reform on the Probability of Holding Debt
The sample includes observations from the 1998 and 1999 surveys. The dependent variable takes value 1 if a new loan was
signed during the previous wave (i.e., if a loan is signed in 1997 for the 1998 surveys, or if a loan is signed in 1998 for the 1999
surveys.) AFTER takes value 1 if the observation is taken in any 1999 survey. The computation of eligibility is described in
the text. Standard errors, in parentheses, are corrected for heteroskedasticity and arbitrary correlation between observations
from the same individual in speciﬁcations (1) and (2). In (3), standard errors allow for autocorrelation within the county.
Speciﬁcations (1), (2) and (3) include the same covariates listed in Table 4.
Dependent variable takes value 1 if individual acquired long-term debt during the previous year, 0 otherwise
Estimation method: OLS OLS OLS Probit Probit Probit
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
[No Cov.] [No Cov.] [Limited Cov.] [No Cov.] [No Cov.] [Limited Cov.]
ELIG1*AFTER*HIGHPRICE -0.012 -0.012 -0.011 -0.009
(0.019) (0.019) (0.010) (0.009)
ELIG2*AFTER*HIGHPRICE 0.008 0.008 0.004 0.007
(0.034) (0.034) (0.026) (0.026)
ELIG3*AFTER*HIGHPRICE 0.034 0.034 0.047 0.045
(0.035) (0.035) (0.047) (0.044)
ELIG1*AFTER -0.01 0.015 0.014 0.001 0.020 0.017
(0.008) (0.016) (0.016) (0.006) (0.012) (0.011)
ELIG2*AFTER -0.011 0.010 0.010 -0.005 0.010 0.006
(0.014) (0.022) (0.022) (0.009) (0.020) (0.018)
ELIG3*AFTER 0.01 0.002 0.002 0.008 -0.005 -0.005
(0.015) (0.030) (0.030) (0.010) (0.018) (0.016)
ELIG1*HIGHPRICE -0.000 -0.001 0.003 0.001
(0.015) (0.015) (0.011) (0.010)
ELIG2*HIGHPRICE 0.008 0.006 0.009 0.007
(0.020) (0.020) (0.018) (0.016)
ELIG3*HIGHPRICE -0.032 -0.032 -0.025 -0.023
(0.022) (0.022) (0.008)*** (0.007)***
ELIG1 -0.052 -0.051 -0.044 -0.055 -0.055 -0.040
(0.006)*** (0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.006)*** (0.011)*** (0.010)***
ELIG2 -0.024 -0.036 -0.033 -0.014 -0.021 -0.016
(0.010)** (0.015)** (0.016)** (0.005)*** (0.007)*** (0.008)**
ELIG3 -0.026 -0.003 -0.003 -0.014 0.009 0.010
(0.008)*** (0.018) (0.018) (0.004)*** (0.015) (0.014)
AFTER 0.019 -0.001 -0.001 0.011 -0.001 0.000
(0.008)** (0.016) (0.015) (0.004)** (0.009) (0.008)
AFTER*HIGHPRICE 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.001
(0.018) (0.018) (0.011) (0.010)
HIGHPRICE 0.003 0.005 0.002 0.003
(0.014) (0.014) (0.008) (0.007)
Constant 0.077 0.071 0.090
(0.006)*** (0.010)*** (0.011)***
Observations 13,886 15,503 15,503 13,886 15,503 15,503
R-squared 0.03 0.01 0.02